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Abstract
An oft-neglected pattern of behavior occurs when ﬁrms time the release of their products so that
they are not released on the same date. The practice is potentially collusive, so there may be legitimate
antitrust concerns. This paper presents a model of this behavior, the alternating periods monopoly
(APM). A comparison of the APM with other sustainable methods of collusion shows the conditions
under which the APM is preferred. I develop an empirical test to detect the APM, and use data from
the baseball card industry to investigate the possible use of an APM.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Economic analyses of timing problems in production typically center around one of the following: capturing
ﬁrst-mover advantage in the industry, the trade-oﬀ between delaying release to produce a higher quality
product or releasing early to earn proﬁts sooner, and the obsolescence problem. While these are important
issues, all are typically associated with a durable good that consumers no longer need to purchase after the
initial purchase, unless they wish to upgrade their current model. A neglected area of timing problems
involves industries in which new products appear frequently, such as in the movie, compact disc, video game,
baseball card, and other entertainment or hobby type industries. In these industries, manufacturers are
constantly releasing new products as consumers amass the old ones and clamor for new ones. Consumers
are believed to have preferences for newness, which I deﬁne in the manner of Krider and Weinberg (1998).
Preferences for newness imply that consumers would like to purchase goods from a certain class each period,
but that due to the durable nature of the good consumers do not wish to purchase the same brand each
period. By class I mean a fairly general categorization of goods like baseball cards or cereal, whereas brand
implies a speciﬁc product from that class, like Fruit Loops for cereal or 2002 Topps Ten for baseball cards.
In the cereal class, the consumer may purchase the same brand of cereal each market period, as the consumer
prefers that brand and his stock is exhausted each period. However, in the case of baseball cards and other
entertainment or hobby type products, consumers typically will not purchase the exact same product each
market period, since the product they purchased in the previous market period still remains usable.
An important aspect of strategic behavior in these industries is how ﬁrms choose to release their products
over time. Perhaps ﬁrms are capable of releasing a new product each week, and all ﬁrms release new,
substitutable products on Friday of each week. This may be viewed as competitive behavior in the market,
as the ﬁrms are competing head-to-head. On the other hand, if ﬁrms are capable of producing a new product
each week, and only one ﬁrm releases a product each week, then the behavior may not be as competitive.
Call this strategy where only one ﬁrm is active in the market per period and then ﬁrms alternate turns being
the active ﬁrm in the market the alternating periods monopoly (APM). Although such a rotation scheme is
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1not necessarily evidence of explicit collusion, it could be used by ﬁrms as a collusive scheme. The primary
incentive for choosing the APM is that it removes intra-period competition among ﬁrms. Perhaps the most
famous use of a collusive strategy similar to the APM is the “phases of the moon” bid rotation scheme
employed in the electrical switchgear industry in the middle of the 20th century. According to Scherer
(1970), this scheme involved:
...dividing the United States into four quadrants, assigning four sellers to each quadrant, and
letting the sellers in a quadrant rotate their bids. A ‘phases of the moon’ system was used to
allocate low-bidding privileges in the high voltage switchgear ﬁeld, with a new seller assuming
low-bidder priority every two weeks. (Scherer, 1970, pgs. 159-161)
To my knowledge, little work has been done on the APM outside of the auction literature. An exception
is Herings, Peeters, and Schinkel (2001) (HPS). Using an algorithm developed in Herings and Peeters (2000)
that solves stochastic games numerically, they show that the alternating periods monopoly is a symmetric
stationary equilibrium for a duopoly market with identical ﬁrms. Furthermore, in their example they show
that regardless of which ﬁrm moves ﬁrst both ﬁrms receive higher proﬁts from the APM than from Cournot
competition as long as the discount rate is suﬃciently high. Section 2 of the current investigation extends
the HPS results by providing general conditions under which the APM is preferred to other forms of industry
behavior, including a form of collusion where ﬁrms equally share the market (ESM).
There is some anecdotal evidence to suggest that ﬁrms may be using the APM when new products are
released. On October 11, 2002, The New York Times (pg. C.1.) reported a breakfast meeting between
Jeﬀrey Katzenberg, a Dreamworks studio founder, and Harvey Weinstein, co-chairman of Miramax Films.
The two discussed the release dates of two Leonardo DiCaprio ﬁlms, Catch Me if You Can and Gangs of
New York. Both were scheduled to open on Christmas Day 2002. In the end, Weinstein altered his release
date and Miramax “chose” to release Gangs of New York just ﬁve days earlier, on December 20th.T h i s
small change in release date was apparently all that was needed to alter expected proﬁts enough to satisfy
both parties, suggesting that what may look like trivial changes in release dates are actually quite important.
There is also experimental evidence that subjects may focus on the APM when given the chance to collude,
even if it is not the strategy that generates the highest proﬁts. Both Isaac and Walker (1985) and Davis
and Holt (1998) report the usage of the APM in experiments where other strategies would perform better
at extracting the monopoly level of proﬁts, the ﬁrst in a sealed bid auction setting and the latter in a posted
oﬀer environment. Kwasnica and Sherstyuk (2002) ﬁnd a result similar to the APM in their experimental
study of collusion in multiple unit auctions with complementarities. They ﬁnd that experimental subjects
are able to collude using bid rotation in two-bidder two-object simultaneous ascending auctions with large
complementarities. Bidders would take turns submitting the minimum bid each round in order to avoid
competing away the complementarity. The use of an APM is similar to using bid rotation to capture
complementarities, where the complementarity in the oligopoly can be deﬁned as the amount each period by
which one-ﬁrm monopoly proﬁts exceed the sum of monopoly proﬁts when k ﬁrms agree to split the market.
Zillante (2005a) ﬁnds mixed results in an experimental investigation constructed to determine if the APM
can arise endogenously using a multi-period binary signaling technique.
Theoretical results regarding the preferability of the APM to other noncooperative and collusive strategies
are developed in section 2. The main result is that the per-period industry proﬁt function must be decreasing
in the number of ﬁrms in order for the APM to be preferred to Cournot behavior. Using this result, it can
then be shown that ﬁrms prefer the APM to a sustainable form of ESM collusion. Section 3 describes the
empirical methodology. Duration models are used to provide evidence as to whether releases are clustered
or spaced. Clustered releases imply that industry behavior does not match the APM. Section 4 provides
a description of the baseball card industry and the data set. The baseball card industry is used because
the primary manufacturers face little competition from smaller manufacturers within the industry. Baseball
cards are also a fairly speciﬁc class of goods, whereas products in other industries may need to be broken
into smaller subcategories, such as genre for movies or music, before assessing the release strategies. Section
5 provides the results of the estimation, and section 6 concludes.
22 Folk Theorem Model
A vast literature exists that provides a theoretical basis for determining the conditions under which collusive
behavior may occur. Most of these results rely on the folk theorem established in Fudenberg and Maskin
(1986). The folk theorem requires that ﬁrms have a discount rate high enough to support the collusive
outcome over the noncooperative outcome in repeated market games, and relies on ﬁrms using a trigger
strategy if other ﬁrms deviate from the agreed upon collusive outcome. Once a deviation is observed ﬁrms
enter a reversionary period where they behave noncooperatively to punish the defector. The reversionary
period may be either a ﬁnite number of periods or may last forever, depending on the structure of the game.
The seminal paper in the literature on sustainable collusion, Green and Porter (1984), extends standard
folk theorem results for repeated games by introducing a model with stochastic demand. Firms produce
the collusive output level unless the market price falls below some trigger price ¯ p. There are two reasons
that the price may fall below ¯ p.T h e ﬁrst is due to the stochastic demand factor. Even if all ﬁrms are
producing their respective collusive shares, there m a yb eal a r g ee n o u g hn e g a t i v ed e m a n ds h o c kt oc a u s e
price to fall below ¯ p. The second occurs when ﬁrms cheat on the collusive agreement by producing more
than their respective collusive shares in any given period. Regardless of the reason, if price falls below ¯ p,
ﬁrms behave noncooperatively for a speciﬁed period of time, then return to producing the collusive output
level. Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) and Staiger and Wolak (1992) are other papers that use the structure
of the Green and Porter model. Although the focus of these papers is primarily on how price wars develop
in periods of high and low demand, the underlying models apply to how ﬁrms can maintain a collusive
agreement in the face of unobservable individual production levels by reverting to punishment periods. A
more thorough review of the literature on sustaining collusion can be found in Jacquemin and Slade (1989).
2.1 Baseline Results
Suppose an industry consists of k risk-neutral ﬁrms facing stochastic market demand in each period. The











be the expected proﬁtt oﬁrm i should all k ﬁrms produce at the Cournot level each time























∀i ∈ (1,2,...,k), (1)




























∀i ∈ (1,2,...,k), (2)
must be satisﬁed if the ﬁrms are to choose the APM over Cournot behavior. Also, the incentive compatibility
constraint insures that ﬁrms will not attempt to deviate from the APM. Deviation occurs by producing in





. It is assumed that deviation from the APM
is observable by all ﬁrms, and that all ﬁrms will produce the Cournot quantity each period after deviation
occurs. While the punishment is harsh, it helps to establish an upper bound on the discount rate necessary
to support the APM. Thus, the APM strategy is for ﬁrms to follow a set order of releasing products,
coupled with the active ﬁrm producing its monopoly quantity, and if deviation occurs, all ﬁrms will produce
the Cournot quantity every period.
Both constraints focus on the ﬁrm that is scheduled to release in the kth spot in the rotation, as shown
by the δ
k−1 term in front of the LHS of each equation. The intuition behind basing the condition on the
ﬁrm in the last spot in the rotation is that if ﬁrm i is willing to participate when placed in the last spot, it
would certainly be willing to participate if it was slotted earlier and received a slightly less discounted payoﬀ
stream.
Although equations (1) and (2) diﬀer by the ﬁrst term on the RHS, both yield the same necessary condition
in order for a discount rate to exist that will ensure the APM is an equilibrium strategy. Although the exact
form of the deviation payoﬀ is unspeciﬁed, the proof of existence of a discount rate to support the APM












∀i ∈ (1,2,...,k). (3)
Proposition 1 If equation (3) is satisﬁed for all ﬁrms, then a discount rate δ
∗ ∈ [0,1) exists such that for
every δ ∈ [δ
∗,1), the APM is an equilibrium strategy.
Proof. The Limit of Means criterion, established in Aumann and Shapley (1994), is a suﬃcient condition
for such a δ
∗ to exist. The Limit of Means criterion states that the sequence (vt
i) of real numbers is
preferred to the sequence (wt
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> 0.E v e r y k periods the ﬁrm receives ε if (vt
i) is chosen instead of (wt
i);o n
average, the ﬁrm receives ε










> 0. Since the limit of
means criterion is not sensitive to a change in a payoﬀ in a single period, the RHS of equations (1) and
(2) are evaluated identically by the Limit of Means criterion, proving that such a δ













Proposition 1 formally deﬁnes the condition necessary to support the repeated game strategy. Intuitively,
ﬁrms will participate in an APM only if the additional gain is not discounted too much. This proposition
implies that for any identical ﬁrm duopoly case with linear demand in the form of a−bQ, constant marginal
costs (c), and a noncooperative payoﬀ that is Cournot, the discount rate must be greater than 0.8 in order
for the APM to be preferred to Cournot behavior. This can be veriﬁed by noting that for two ﬁrms the
Cournot proﬁtp e rﬁrm is
(a−c)2
9b . The monopoly proﬁti s
(a−c)2
4b . For the second ﬁrm to prefer the APM














Solving for δ gives δ ≥ 0.8. The discount rate necessary to support the APM in a 4-ﬁrm industry with
linear demand, constant marginal costs, and identical ﬁrms is actually lower, at 0.765, and can be found in a
similar manner. Given the frequency of releases for the product classes under consideration, the interest rates






is the Cournot proﬁt, the condition holds for any general noncooperative or competitive proﬁt






2.2 Comparison of Sustainable Collusive Arrangements
Neither the APM nor the ESM is Pareto superior in terms of expected payoﬀs if collusion holds. This can be
veriﬁed by realizing that all ﬁrms, in expectation, receive the same amount of undiscounted expected proﬁts
in either the APM or the ESM, assuming no punishment periods for ESM. However, the ﬁrst ﬁrm to release
in the APM receives its share of the proﬁts sooner in the APM than in the ESM, while the last ﬁrm to
release in the APM receives its share of the proﬁts sooner in the ESM than in the APM. One potential ﬂaw
in comparing the APM and the ESM is that the ESM is not sustainable if it is assumed that ﬁrms cannot
observe each others exact production levels and demand is stochastic, unless there is credible commitment
by the ﬁrms to revert to noncooperation for a speciﬁed amount of time if the price in the market drops too
low.
Since neither the APM nor the ESM without reversions is Pareto superior in expected payoﬀs, I compare
the APM with a sustainable version of the ESM. The sustainable ESM is a modiﬁed version of the Green
and Porter model, where the key element to the sustainability of that model is that ﬁrms enter reversionary
noncooperative periods with positive probability. The basic outline of models of this type is that k ﬁrms
in the industry agree to produce 1
k of the monopoly quantity each period. However, the market price
ﬂuctuates based upon both the amount produced in a period as well as a stochastic factor. Assume the
market price has distribution function F (p(Q)) and disturbances are iid across time and independent of the
4market quantity, Q. A trigger price, ¯ p, is determined by the ﬁrms, and if the price falls below ¯ p ﬁrms play a
noncooperative market game for T periods. Even though production levels are unobservable between ﬁrms
these models are sustainable versions of the ESM because ﬁrms commit to entering the punishment phase
regardless of the reason price falls below ¯ p. Thus, the incentive to deviate by producing more than 1
k of the
monopoly quantity each period is removed.
Let F (¯ p) be the probability that the price is below the trigger price. I have suppressed the argument
to the demand function since all ﬁrms will produce 1
k of the monopoly quantity in each collusive period in
equilibrium in the sustainable ESM. Again, letting E [Πm
i ] be the expected monopoly proﬁtp e rp e r i o da n d
E [Πc
i] be the expected k-ﬁrm Cournot proﬁt per period, the expected equilibrium lifetime proﬁts of any ﬁrm
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. (5)
It should be noted that I have set the number of reversionary periods the ﬁrms will play, T, equal to one in
setting up the lifetime proﬁt function.1
Since equation (5) is somewhat cumbersome, I use a simpliﬁed version to show that if a discount rate
exists that supports the APM as an equilibrium strategy, then all ﬁrms prefer the APM to the sustainable
ESM model for some subset of those discount rates. Let x ∈ (0,1]. Since equation (3) must hold for the
APM to exist, ﬁrms prefer that they spend more time in the collusive state than in the noncollusive state,
which implies that ﬁrms prefer lifetime proﬁt functions with larger probabilities of being in the collusive
state. For equation (5), it can be shown that ﬁrms attain their highest probability of being in the collusive













such that ﬁrms will prefer the lifetime proﬁt function where the probability
of being in the collusive state is (1 − x) to the lifetime proﬁt function where the probability of being in the





. Thus, if the APM can be shown to be preferred to the simpliﬁed


















by transitivity it can be shown to be preferred to the actual sustainable ESM found in equation (5).
It can then be shown that the APM will be preferred by the last ﬁrm in the rotation to the ESM when





















Proposition 2 If equation (3) is satisﬁed for all ﬁrms, ∀x ∈ (0,1] a δ
∗ exists such that for every δ ∈ [δ
∗,1)
the inequality in equation (7) holds, showing the APM is preferred to the sustainable ESM.
Proof. The Limit of Means criterion is a suﬃcient condition for such a δ
∗ to exist and it is deﬁn e di nt h e
previous proof. Deﬁne the sequence (vt









. Under the Limit of Means
criterion, this sequence (vt
i) is evaluated identically to the sequence of payoﬀs generated by the APM, which





every kth period. Deﬁne (wt
i) as:
1Although the choice of T should be endogenously determined by the discount rate and payoﬀs, a choice of T =1assumes
that discount rates are high, which they must be for the APM to be an equilibrium strategy.
2Technically ﬁrms prefer the Green and Porter case where there is no chance of reversion to noncooperation to the cases
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> 0,∀x ∈ (0,1].
QED
Given that neither the ESM without a reversionary period nor the APM are Pareto superior methods of
collusion, proposition 2 provides a powerful result. If demand is stochastic and ﬁrms are risk-neutral, then
the APM is preferred to the sustainable ESM by even the last ﬁrm to produce in the APM rotation. Note
that this proposition still requires a discount rate high enough to support the APM. Intuitively, because
there is positive probability of receiving the Cournot payoﬀ with certainty in some periods, the undiscounted
proﬁts for all ﬁrms are lower in the sustainable ESM than they are in the APM. Assuming a discount rate
of one and a four-ﬁrm industry, the fourth ﬁrm in the APM would receive a proﬁt vector of (0,0,0,E[Πm
i ]).
In the sustainable ESM there is no guarantee that the ﬁrm receives a sum of undiscounted proﬁts over four
periods equal to E [Πm
i ] due to the probability of a reversionary period.
Two ﬁnal notes about the model need to be made. First, there are additional equilibria which can be
viewed as APM strategies but in which the ﬁrms do not follow a set rotation. In fact, alternating the
rotation from a strict 1,2,3,4,1,2,34, etc. pattern to something like 1,2,3,4,4,3,2,1,1,2, etc. can actually lower
the discount rate necessary to support the strategy. Thus, it is possible for ﬁrms to play an APM strategy
without actually following a set rotation. Second, the model assumes each ﬁrm releases in its own “market
period”. While a “market period” is a somewhat nebulous concept once the real-world consideration of
continuous time is considered, the typical assumption is that market periods are of the same length. Thus,
it is assumed in the discrete time APM model that the product releases are equally spaced. Zillante (2004)
discusses how consumer preferences can cause the equal spacing of products to be an equilibrium response.
2.3 Additional considerations
The baseline results established above apply under very general circumstances. I brieﬂy present two speciﬁc
industry conditions that may aﬀect the decision of the ﬁrms as to whether or not they should form an
APM. The ﬁrst is innovation costs, which are related to the concept of preferences for newness. If the
ﬁrm is constantly developing new brands, a logical next step is to assume the ﬁrm is constantly incurring
innovation costs.3 Let Πm be the monopoly proﬁt, I be the innovation cost, k be the number of ﬁrms and
N be the number of periods the market will meet. If ﬁrms collude using an ESM strategy then each ﬁrm will
have to pay the innovation cost each period, and an individual ﬁrm’s undiscounted monopoly proﬁts would
be given by (Πm
k −I)N.I f ﬁrms use an APM strategy, then each ﬁrm receives (Πm
k − I
k)N. Although this
simple example neglects discounting, it is trivial to show that ﬁrms prefer the APM in this environment since
they only have to pay the innovation cost N
k t i m e sa so p p o s e dt oN times in the ESM. In fact, HPS shows
numerically that the introduction of an entry cost each period will only make the APM a more attractive
strategy. In addition, they show that if per period entry costs are too high, Cournot competition involves
losses for both ﬁrms and a collapse of the industry, while the APM allows both ﬁrms and the industry to
remain active.
Production technologies are a second factor that could aﬀect the viability of the APM. With baseball
c a r d si ti sn o td i ﬃcult for a manufacturer to stop the printing presses and restart them when it is his turn to
produce or to produce continuously and warehouse the cards. Alternatively, consider the market for milk.
Although producers may want to use an APM monopoly, it seems unlikely that each manufacturer could
shut down his cows until it was his turn to produce again. This makes it unlikely that an APM would be
used because the production technology and the fact that the products are perishable would not allow it.
Also, consider the railroad industry, which is the basis for Green and Porter. It seems unlikely that an APM
would work well due to the networking needed between rail lines to serve consumers. If a consumer needs
3This analysis also applies to industries where ﬁrms are not developing new products. In these cases it is more useful to
consider the innovation cost as a recurring entry cost or ﬁxed cost incurred if the ﬁrm produces.
6to transport himself or his product and the rail company “in” that period does not have access to lines to
complete the trip, the consumer may ﬁnd alternative methods to using the railroad, defeating the purpose
of the APM.
3 Empirical Methodology
Papers that attempt to detect whether or not observed industry behavior is consistent with collusion tend
to fall into two categories. Papers such as Baker and Bresnahan (1985) and Nevo (2001) constitute a ﬁrst
category. These papers analyze residual demand within the beer and cereal markets respectively. These
residual demand techniques rely on cross-sectional price and quantity data to determine the substitutability
of goods within the product category when prices change. While useful in industries where the same
goods are consumed over time, these techniques are not as useful in industries with preferences for newness
because they rely on estimating cross-price elasticities between brands. One of the keys to the residual
demand analysis is that all or most brands be available during the same time periods, allowing for the
consistent estimation of these elasticities when prices change. In the baseball card industry, and, more
generally, industries with preferences for newness, there may not be much available data on simultaneous
sales of products released even a few time periods apart.
Papers such as Porter and Zona (1993) and Bajari and Ye (2002), which attempt to determine whether
collusive bidding has occurred in procurement auctions, constitute the second category. The collusion
detection methods in these papers rely on participation in each auction by cartel and non-cartel members.
Using the bids submitted by all ﬁrms and controlling for other factors, it is possible, under conditions of
conditional independence of bids and exchangeability, to determine which bids placed in the auction could
be collusive. While the bid rotation schemes used in auctions closely parallel the APM, the techniques used
to determine if behavior in procurement auctions is consistent with collusion relies upon observing both the
winner of the auction (i.e. the sole producer in the APM) and the bids of other participants. In addition,
each procurement contract is granted to only one winner, whereas it is possible for two or more ﬁrms to
produce in the same market period. Given the lack of data and the potential to have multiple producers in
one period, the methods developed for detecting collusive behavior in auctions are unsuitable for detecting
the APM in the baseball card industry.
Due to the limitations of these methods, particularly in regards to goods with preferences for newness
characteristics, an alternative approach is used in an attempt to detect potentially collusive behavior. Du-
ration models are used to determine if the product releases in the baseball card industry are spaced out over
time or clustered. While the results found using duration analysis are not as powerful as those made with
the techniques described above, there is little room for manipulation of the data by ﬁrms who wish to avoid
detection. The only method capable of avoiding detection is clustering releases, which defeats the purpose
of the APM.
3.1 Duration Analysis
In order to determine whether brands are randomly introduced into the market, I estimate a set of duration
models to test for duration dependence. Duration dependence can be deﬁned as the impact the length of a
spell has on the timing of the end of the spell. If data exhibits positive duration dependence it means that
as more time passes it is more likely the spell will end, while negative duration dependence means that as
more time passes it is less likely the spell will end. A third type of duration dependence, constant, means
that the length of the duration has no impact on the probability it will end. In the baseball card industry,
as well as others, positive duration dependence implies that the probability that a new release occurs is
increasing since the time of the last release, while negative duration dependence implies that the probability
is decreasing. Thus positive duration dependence is consistent with the notion that ﬁrms are waiting to
release products, while negative duration dependence implies clustering of products.
A more intuitive method to determine whether positive or negative duration dependence is occurring is
to look at the hazard function. For a distribution function, F (t), and its associated density function, f (t),
the hazard function is deﬁned as
h(t)=
f (t)
1 − F (t)
. (8)
7The hazard function evaluated at t tells the probability of an event occurring given that we have observed a
duration of length t. An increasing hazard function reﬂects positive duration dependence while a decreasing
hazard function reﬂects negative duration dependence. It is also possible to have constant duration depen-
dence, which is shown by a hazard rate independent of t. Constant duration dependence would imply that
product releases occur randomly, and that the length of the duration has neither an increasing nor decreasing
eﬀect on when a new release will occur. The exponential distribution function, 1−exp(−λt),i sa ne x a m p l e
of a distribution function with a constant hazard rate, which in this case is λ.
The Weibull distribution function is used to determine which type of duration dependence exists in the
data. The Weibull function is chosen because the hazard function can display increasing, decreasing, or
constant duration dependence depending on the shape parameter. The Weibull distribution function is
P(t)=1− exp(−λtα), (9)
and its hazard function is
h(t)=λαtα−1. (10)
The variable λ is the scale parameter, and α is the shape parameter. A test of α equal to 1 vs. α not equal to
1 is equivalent to testing whether the Weibull can be statistically distinguished from the exponential model,
which provides a test as to whether the hazard rate is constant. Additionally, the Weibull distribution can
establish positive duration dependence if α is statistically greater than 1, or negative duration dependence
if α is less than 1.
While the duration models are not directly linked to the theoretical model in section 2, it can be shown
that increasing hazards are consistent with equalization of product spacing, while decreasing hazards are
consistent with clustering. Consider an industry which produces N products over a ﬁxed time period of
length T days. The N releases determine N − 1 durations. If the ﬁrms are following the APM where
releases are equally spaced, then one release occurs every T
N−1 days, which is also the average duration
length regardless of how the releases are spaced. If the products are equally spaced, then the standard
deviation of the durations is zero, as every duration is equal to the average duration. Now, consider the
standard deviation of the durations if all the releases occur on either the ﬁrst or last day of T,w i t ha tl e a s t
one release occurring on each of those two days. This release pattern, which clusters all the product releases
on two days and is more consistent with competitive behavior than cooperative behavior when goods are
substitutes, results in the standard deviation being maximized for given N and T.
For a given N and T,c a l c u l a t et h ec o e ﬃcient of variation (CV). Note that the mean of the durations will
be constant for given N and T, which causes the standard deviation to determine the CV. When the standard
deviation is 0, releases are equally spaced, and the CV is also 0. As the standard deviation increases, the CV
increases. When the standard deviation and mean are equal, the CV equals 1. Linhart (1965) establishes
that the shape parameter of the Weibull distribution (α) and the CV are inversely related.4 As the CV
increases from 0 to 1, α decreases from inﬁnity to 1. The CV and α are equal at 1, and as the CV approaches
inﬁnity, α approaches 0. When the data are underdispersed, the hazard of the Weibull will be increasing,
and when the data are overdispersed, the hazard of the Weibull will be decreasing. Underdispersion is
consistent with the APM, and overdispersion with releases being clustered. Thus, it is possible to use
duration analysis to determine if the releases are consistent with the APM.
4 Baseball Card Industry and Data
I use data from the baseball card industry to determine if the manufacturers of baseball cards are using a
form of the APM. The baseball card industry is characterized by fairly stable participation, as entry into
the baseball card market is controlled by Major League Baseball (MLB) and the Major League Baseball
Player’s Association (MLBPA). Firms must obtain licenses from both entities to produce products that
appeal to collectors. The licenses require a ﬁxed annual payment, and percentage payments on any revenues
above a certain level. During the time period of interest, 1999-2003, the baseball card industry was a 4-ﬁrm
industry, although the fourth ﬁrm has changed from Paciﬁc (1998-2000) to Playoﬀ (2001-2003). The other
three manufacturers, Topps, Fleer, and Upper Deck, have retained their licenses since 1989. For more
information on the baseball card industry, see Zillante (2005b).
4While the discussion focuses on the Weibull, this is also true for the Gamma distribution, from which the Weibull is derived.





Figure 1: Timeline of product releases by each manufacturer for 1/1/2003 — 6/30/2003
4.1 Data
The data consist of the release dates and descriptive statistics of 349 of the 356 baseball card releases that
occurred between January 1st, 1999 and December 31st, 2003. Only products which focused primarily on
MLB, were released in pack form, and were released nationally are included. This excludes 4 products.
Release dates for 319 of the products were taken from weekly issues of Sports Collector’s Digest (SCD),
a well-established hobby publication. In a typical issue, SCD provides price guides, checklists, or press
releases for products which were recently released or which will be released shortly after the print date of
the magazine. SCD also lists descriptive information about the product, such as suggested retail price per
pack of cards, the number of cards in a pack, and the release date of the product. SCD reports release dates
using either “ships” or “shipped”. Whenever possible, the release dates were taken when SCD described
the product as “shipped”, since this implies an actual ship date. There are 30 release dates that were
not obtained from SCD. These release dates were obtained either from the baseball card manufacturers’
websites; a second baseball card publication, Beckett Baseball Collector; or from Beckett Publications’
website, www.beckett.com. Although there are 7 products for which I could not obtain release dates, there
a r en om o r et h a n4m i s s i n gf r o ma n yo n ey e a r . T h ef e wm i s s i n gd a t e sh a v el i t t l ei m p a c to nt h ee m p i r i c a l
results.
For the 349 releases, there were 297 distinct release dates. The most releases occurring on any day was
3, which occurred 11 times, and 2 releases on the same day occurred 30 times. All of the dates on which
3 products were released occurred after 2001, and 6 of the 11 dates had at least one release that was a
“high-end” release, with a SRP greater than $9.98. There seems to be no manufacturer that was targeted
by the others, as all manufacturers participated in 5 to 7 of these 11 dates, with 7 to 10 products for each
manufacturer.
Figures 1 and 2 show the actual date of each release by manufacturer for the calendar year 2003. The
vertical gridlines are placed every 4.5 days, which is approximately the average length of time between release
dates. Brands with suggested retail prices greater than $9.98 are set slightly above the lower priced brands
for each manufacturer. Note that some releases may blend together if one manufacturer released multiple
products on the same day or a short time span apart. While the spacing is not perfectly equal, the ﬁgures





Figure 2: Timeline of product releases by each manufacturer for 7/1/2003 — 12/31/2003
provide some evidence for the spacing of product releases, particularly by individual manufacturers. The
one manufacturer which does not appear to space its releases over the course of the calendar year is Playoﬀ,
as most of Playoﬀ’s releases in ﬁgure 2 are clustered from July to September. There are a few long lags
by individual manufacturers, most occurring between August and November. There are likely two reasons
for these long lags. One is that baseball’s regular season is ending, and manufacturers are waiting until
the baseball postseason is completed to release their newest products. The other is that the professional
football and basketball seasons begin during this time period, and the manufacturers may be focusing on
releasing products related to these two sports as their seasons begin.
5R e s u l t s
The results are presented in the following manner. First, I present the results of the estimation for the entire
time period for all releases and for releases with a SRP less than $9.99. Low-priced releases are separated
because high-priced releases may represent a diﬀerent market. Next, I focus on the estimation for individual
ﬁrms. This is done to see if ﬁrms are spacing their own releases, or if individual ﬁrms cluster their releases.
Finally, I present results for 2 and 3 ﬁrm combinations. These results are presented to determine if there
are any combinations of ﬁrms within the industry which seem to be playing an APM, even if the industry
as a whole is not. Durations for 2 and 3 ﬁrm combinations are calculated by removing the release dates of
manufacturers not included in the combination, and then recalculating the durations based upon the releases
that remain.
There has been one small adjustment to the data. In cases where multiple releases occur on the same
day, the duration in days from one release to the next is 0. However, the likelihood function for the Weibull
distribution is undeﬁned if an observation equals zero. In order to circumvent this problem, on days where
2 releases occurred, the duration with a value of 0 is adjusted upward to 0.1, while the following duration is
adjusted downward by 0.1. When 3 releases occur on the same day, the two durations with a value of 0 are
each adjusted upward to 0.1, while the following duration is adjusted downward by 0.2. These changes are
small, preserve the length of the time period, and do not aﬀect the qualitative results of the estimation.
10Combination λ (Scale) α (Shape) # durations #d a y s
All 0.2370∗∗∗ 0.8956∗∗∗ 348 1821
1999 0.1894∗∗∗ 0.9227 55 345
2000 0.1859∗∗∗ 0.9574 59 349
2001 0.3079∗∗∗ 0.8932 69 338
2002 0.2760∗∗∗ 0.8895∗ 81 362
2003 0.2413∗∗∗ 0.9593 80 358
Low prices 0.2215∗∗∗ 0.8916∗∗∗ 317 1809
The asterisks refer to signiﬁcance levels for a 2-tailed test of λ=0 and a 1-tailed test for α≷1.
∗∗∗ is signiﬁcant at 1%, ∗∗ is signiﬁcant at 5%, and ∗ is signiﬁcant at 10%
Table 1: Duration results for models incorporating all manufacturers
Combination λ (Scale) α (Shape) # durations #d a y s
Fleer (F) 0.0288∗∗∗ 1.1098∗ 76 1792
Paciﬁc 0.0063 1.3994∗ 20 679
Playoﬀ 0.0715∗∗∗ 0.8627∗ 41 940
Topps (T) 0.0368∗∗∗ 1.1635∗∗∗ 109 1777
Upper Deck (UD) 0.0154∗∗∗ 1.3955∗∗∗ 99 1821
The asterisks refer to signiﬁcance levels for a 2-tailed test of λ=0 and a 1-tailed test for α≷1.
∗∗∗ is signiﬁcant at 1%, ∗∗ is signiﬁcant at 5%, and ∗ is signiﬁcant at 10%
Table 2: Duration results for individual ﬁrms
5.1 All Releases
Table 1 provides the estimation results for the duration model when all the releases are used, only low-priced
releases are used, and for each individual year from 1999 to 2003. The estimated coeﬃcient for α when all
the data is used is 0.8956, and this result is signiﬁcantly less than 1 at the 1% level. Using only the low
price data yields a similar coeﬃcient for α, and it is also signiﬁcantly less than 1 at the 1% level. While the
results do not suggest that the manufacturers are using the APM, they are consistent with comments in trade
publications made by both hobby store owners and consumers. Both parties suggest that manufacturers
are clustering their releases too much.
There are two reasons to estimate model for individual calendar years. The ﬁrst is to determine if releases
are becoming more spaced out or more clustered over time. The second reason is more subtle. Due to the
fact that the number of releases diﬀers from year to year, it is possible that looking at the entire 5-year span
combines data with diﬀerent equally spaced durations. For example, in 1999 the average duration length
was 6.3, while in 2003 the average duration length was 4.48. Combining these data may obscure results for
individual years. As table 1 shows, the estimated α coeﬃcients for each year are slightly higher than those
for the entire time period.
Although none of the estimated α coeﬃcients are signiﬁcantly less than 1, they are increasing as time
passes. There is a drop in 2001, although this is likely due to Playoﬀ replacing Paciﬁc as the fourth
manufacturer. Due to the lag time between Playoﬀ receiving its license and actual production, all of
Playoﬀ’s releases for 2001 occurred after February. Also of signiﬁcance is that the manufacturers become
better at spacing their releases even as the number of releases increases.
5.2 Individual Firm Releases
Although the results of the estimation for all releases by all ﬁrms show that the ﬁrms are not following the
APM, it is possible to use the estimation technique to determine if ﬁrms are individually attempting to use
an APM technique. To calculate the durations used in this section, simply remove all the releases by ﬁrms
other than the one in question, and calculate the durations based on the remaining releases.
The results of the estimation suggest that ﬁrms are following the APM at the individual level. Table 2
shows the results of the estimation for each of the individual manufacturers. The hazards for Topps and
11Combination λ (Scale) α (Shape) # durations #d a y s
F, P 0.0934∗∗∗ 0.9372 139 1792
F, T 0.1036∗∗∗ 1.0012 186 1792
F, UD 0.0934∗∗∗ 1.0133 176 1821
P, T 0.1112∗∗∗ 0.9489 172 1777
P, UD 0.0897∗∗∗ 0.9970 162 1821
T, UD (all) 0.0991∗∗∗ 1.0654 209 1821
T, UD (99-00) 0.0699∗∗∗ 1.1188 64 668
T, UD (01-03) 0.1025∗∗∗ 1.0938∗ 137 1070
F, P, T 0.1711∗∗∗ 0.9119∗∗ 249 1792
F, P, UD 0.1615∗∗∗ 0.9146∗∗ 239 1821
F, T, UD 0.1754∗∗∗ 0.9513 286 1821
P, T, UD 0.1698∗∗∗ 0.9443 272 1821
The asterisks refer to signiﬁcance levels for a 2-tailed test of λ=0 and a 1-tailed test for α≷1.
∗∗∗ is signiﬁcant at 1%, ∗∗ is signiﬁcant at 5%, and ∗ is signiﬁcant at 10%
Table 3: Duration results for selected ﬁrm combinations
Upper Deck are increasing, and the estimated coeﬃcients for α are signiﬁcantly greater than 1 at the 1%
level. The estimates of α for Fleer and Paciﬁc are also greater than 1, and these estimates are signiﬁcant at
the 10% level. Note that these estimates are signiﬁcantly greater than 1 despite the fact that the number of
releases, and thus the average duration length, are changing over time. The only manufacturer with an α
less than 1 is Playoﬀ, the newest entrant. Recall from ﬁgures 1 and 2 that Playoﬀ appears to have the most
clustered releases, and that the other manufacturers have more consistently spaced releases. While ﬁgures
1 and 2 only show the release dates for 2003, ﬁgures for other years show similar patterns for individual
manufacturers.
Taken as a whole, these results suggest that manufacturers believe that their own products may compete
with each other, and they tend to space the releases of their own products. Another possibility is that
production lags cause each individual manufacturer to space its product, although if production lags were
the cause it would be possible to increase capacity to oﬀset any production lags. The results also show
that it is possible for the technique to yield estimates of α that suggest the APM is occurring, and that
these results are consistent with conjectures that are consistent with conjectures that could be made about
behavior by looking at the data directly.
5.3 Multiple Firm Releases
Table 3 shows the results of the remaining ﬁrm combinations. Note that Playoﬀ and Paciﬁc are treated
as one ﬁrm in an eﬀort to utilize all of the data. Because their licenses do not overlap, no releases by the
ﬁrms overlap, so they were never in competition with one another. Results for 1999-2000 using only Paciﬁc
releases and for 2001-2003 using only Playoﬀ releases are not reported to conserve space, but are discussed
below. The abbreviations for table 3 are as deﬁned in table 2.
In most of these combinations, the hazard function is decreasing or constant, suggesting that most ﬁrms
are clustering their releases. However, most of these coeﬃcients are not signiﬁcantly less than 1. The
combination of Topps and Upper Deck is interesting because it has an increasing hazard, suggesting that
the two major manufacturers attempt to avoid releasing products on the same day. Also, α is signiﬁcantly
greater than 1 near the 12% level. For this combination, I chose to examine the data at a ﬁner level,
breaking the Topps and Upper Deck combination into 2 sections, 1999-2000 and 2001-2003. For each of
these sections, the hazard is increasing, and the result for the years 2001-2003 is signiﬁcantly greater than
1 at the 10% level. Again, the ﬁner data supports the hypothesis that the two major manufacturers are
attempting to space their releases.
The results using only Playoﬀ data are qualitatively similar to the results in table 3 that combine Playoﬀ
and Paciﬁc. The results using only the Paciﬁc data are slightly diﬀerent. When Paciﬁca n dF l e e ra r e
combined for 1999-2000, the estimation reveals a decreasing hazard, consistent with the results in table 3.
However, when Paciﬁc, Topps, and Upper Deck are combined, the hazard rates are increasing, although
12not signiﬁcantly greater than 1. This suggests a few possibilities. One is that Paciﬁc, being the smallest
manufacturer, may not have had a large enough collector base to draw customers into the store by itself.
Thus, Paciﬁc released its products closer to the weakest of the 3 remaining manufacturers, perhaps hoping
that Fleer would draw customers to the store, but not customers who were predetermined to buy Fleer
products. Another possibility is that Fleer attempted to drive Paciﬁc from the market by releasing around
t h es a m et i m ea sP a c i ﬁc. This clustering of Fleer and Paciﬁc releases, coupled with the fact that Playoﬀ
tends to cluster its own releases, is the reason that combinations with Fleer and Paciﬁct e n dt oh a v el o w e r
estimates for α than other combinations.
6C o n c l u s i o n
This investigation began by noting that ﬁrms could potentially use a form of strategic release called the
alternating periods monopoly to hinder competition. Theoretical results using a repeated market game
structure are provided, and it is shown that when market demand is stochastic, risk-neutral ﬁrms prefer the
alternating periods monopoly to models of collusion where the market is shared by all ﬁrms each period and
adherence to the collusive agreement is enforced by reversion to punishment phases if the market price drops
below a speciﬁed level.
Duration analysis is the empirical technique used to determine whether or not the manufacturers in the
baseball card industry are employing the APM strategy. When the entire range of data is considered,
it appears as if the baseball card manufacturers are not releasing products in a manner that is consistent
with the APM. This is consistent with anecdotal evidence within the industry. However, when looked at
over time and by manufacturer, the results are not as clear. Manufacturers certainly realize that spacing
their own releases is a valuable strategy, and when only the releases of the two largest manufacturers are
considered, it is apparent that they have been acting in a manner consistent with the APM.
Unfortunately, the econometric technique used in this investigation is not powerful enough to distinguish
between collusive and noncollusive behavior among ﬁrms. It should be noted that this is not solely a
failure of this technique, but of most econometric techniques that attempt to detect collusion. Both Bajari
and Ye (2002) and Porter and Zona (1993) state that when some assumptions of their models are violated,
collusion and competition are observationally equivalent. Since the duration analysis technique merely
provides evidence that behavior matches a potentially collusive strategy, it should not be seen as a deﬁnitive
statement as to whether ﬁrms are actively participating in a cartel, but as a starting point for a more
exhaustive investigation. Also, it is hoped that this technique will be the starting point for a more powerful
econometric test that will perform better at diﬀerentiating collusion from competition.
One potential extension that could be made to this study would look at how ﬁrms could use an APM
in multiple markets. The four baseball card manufacturers also compete in other trading card markets,
primarily football and basketball. The theory in this study considers only producers who compete in one
market, with products that are close substitutes. It may be the case that ﬁrms that compete in multiple
markets are able to rotate products in such a manner that none of them faces a period where they are
inactive, or that ﬁrms are able to reap greater proﬁts by controlling multiple monopolies each period.
Overall welfare eﬀects should be determined before a ﬁnal judgment is made on the legality of the APM.
It is quite possible that the APM is a particularly devastating form of collusion in that it raises per-period
prices and, in industries with preferences for newness, reduces the variety of goods available to consumers.
However, it is also possible that consumers beneﬁt from the APM by being able to enjoy a continual stream
of new goods rather than being bombarded with a glut of new products all at once. Suppose consumers
have preferences for newness. Consumers may prefer a situation where one ﬁrm releases a new product
each period rather than one where all the ﬁrms release their new products at the same time followed by a
few periods of no new product releases. While both scenarios may see the exact same amount and type
of products released, consumers may prefer the stream of releases to the alternative scenario because the
products will seem to have a “newness” feature to them. Thus, the APM may not be harmful to welfare,
especially if ﬁrms have high innovation costs in the development of new products.
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